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Webpage Source Based Covert Channel
Tarun Madiraju, Daryl Johnson, Bo Yuan, Peter Lutz
B. Thomas Golisano College of Computing & Information Sciences
Rochester Institute of Technology, Rochester, NY USA

Abstract - Covert Channels can be used for enabling hidden
communication mechanisms that can facilitate secret message
transfer. This paper presents a new covert channel based on
the HTML source of a webpage. The new covert channel while
featuring high bandwidth also demonstrates high
imperceptibility as it doesn’t involve any modifications to the
source or the visibility of the webpage and is independent of
timing of page requests. The availability of page source for a
webpage on the Internet makes this covert channel easy to
implement and effective.
Keywords: Network Security, Covert Channels, Information
Hiding, Webpage
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Introduction

Covert channel were first defined by Lampson as a
communication channel that was not intended for information
transfer [1]. This covert channel, defined in 1973, was based
on trusted host systems but can be applied to any shared
environment. Covert channel research has migrated into many
other environments since then such as networked services.
The DoD’s Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria
(TCSEC) [2] describes a covert channel as a communication
channel that facilitates transfer of information between entities
in such a manner that the system’s security policy is violated.
They also mention that the presence of a communication
channel cannot be supported without the complete knowledge
of the channel. A relatively recent definition states that a
covert channel can be established by hiding and transmitting
data over a legitimate communication channel [3].
Covert channels can be classified into three types: Storage
Channels, Timing Channels and Behavioral Channels [4].
Covert storage channels include communicating entities that
are involved in a direct or indirect form of writing to/reading
from a storage location. Covert timing channels are described
as scenarios where a process signals information to another
process by modulating its own use of system resources in such
a manner that the real response time observed by the second
process is affected [2]. Behavioral type of channels are
generally application specific wherein the behavior of an

application is used to define and communicate information
between the participating entities of the covert channel [4].
A typical HTML page on the Internet consists of HTML tags,
regular text and URLs linking to other pages. In order to
implement our covert channel, we utilize the text and the
URLs available in the HTML source of a webpage. The fact
that an existing webpage’s source can be used to build a
message dictionary without modifying any content illustrates
the advantage this covert channel possesses. The purpose of
this project was to demonstrate a practical covert channel that
is difficult to be detected by an active administrator or a
regular observer. Further, the administrator or the observer
should not be able to understand the covert message if
discovered.
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Paper Organization

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 3 discusses the literature review which mentions
existing work in HTML based covert channels. Section 4
details the design, methodology and experiments. Section 5
presents the characteristics of the proposed covert channel.
Section 6 discusses the future work. Finally, Section 7
presents the summary of this new covert channel.
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Literature Review

Previous works have discussed and implemented covert
channels based on HTML. These works include embedding
invisible characters into the html source, using uppercase and
lowercase of letters in html tags, using attributes of html
elements, etc [5], [6], [7], [8]. The method that involves
embedding invisible characters into html source denotes white
space as 0 and tab as 1. The invisible characters are
embedded into the webpage by adding white spaces and tabs
at the end of sentences or lines [6]. This method is simple to
implement however, issues associated with this methods
include: high perceptibility as a result of increase in webpage
size, need to modify the web page source, and it is easier to
destroy the steganographic covert channel by deleting
additional white spaces and tabs. The second method is
implemented by switching the case of the letters in html
elements called tags [5]. The secret message was embedded by
utilizing the letter case where uppercase letters were used to

represent the binary value 1 and lowercase letters were
referred to as 0. This method doesn’t lengthen the size of a
webpage but the switched case of the letters can be used to
decode the embedded message. This covert channel can be
broken by converting all the tag letters to uppercase or
lowercase format. The third method takes advantage of the
attributes of the HTML elements. The attributes of an element
in HTML can be used in any order without effecting the
webpage content and visibility. The authors Dongsheng Shen
and Hong Zhao used a mapping scheme between permutations
of attributes and binary strings to implement an embedding
and extracting process thereby achieving information hiding
[7]. This method doesn’t increase the webpage size and is
relatively robust. Another attribute based webpage information
hiding scheme described in [8] makes use of the property
“equal attribute object has identical function” to define a set of
rules for embedding and extracting secret information.

client) IP and the encoding mechanism. It is important to
understand that in the current proposal the receiver is
implemented at the web server and hence the receiving entity
must own the web server or must have compromised the web
server. But the covert channel can be implemented beyond the
mentioned scenario. For example, the covert channel can be
implemented for scenarios where the receiver exists between
the web client and the web server. This man-in-the-middle
receiver captures HTTP requests from the sender in order to
decode the messages based on the requested pages. An
advantage of this approach is that the receiver need not have
control over a web server and any webpage could be selected
rather than a webpage from the owned or compromised
server. This overcomes the limitation of selecting a webpage
from a web server that is either owned or compromised by the
receiving entity. However, in this paper we restrict our study
to owned/compromised web server as the receiver.

The following covert channel mechanisms closely relate to our
proposed covert channel. William Huba et al. briefly discuss a
covert channel based on the webpage browsing pattern [9]
which is currently unimplemented. Erik Brown et al. presented
three techniques to implement covert channels using webpage
browsing patterns [10]. In the first technique, a value 0 or 1 is
assigned for a page request on the basis of its distance from
the root node. In the second mechanism, every page of the
web site is designated as 0 or 1. The third mechanism denotes
values 0 if the pattern of the page requests were in breadthfirst search format while a depth-first search would indicate
the value 1.

4.2

The discussed mechanisms offer low bandwidth and hence do
not facilitate high capacity channels. Our approach
demonstrates the characteristics of imperceptibility and
robustness without compromising on the channel capacity.
Unlike the first three studies mentioned above which
implement unidirectional channel from the web server to the
client, our work focuses on establishing a unidirectional
communication channel from client to web server. In addition
it focuses on using words available in the webpage as message
components and URLs available in the webpage for enabling
covert transfer of the message without any modifications to the
existing source of web pages.
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4.1

Proposed Covert Channel
Design

The proposed covert channel establishes a unidirectional
communication scheme between the communicating entities.
Typically, the communicating entities of this covert channel
are a web server, as receiver, and a web client, as the sender.
For any covert channel to be implemented successfully,
certain information must be shared between the
communicating parties prior to transferring of covert
messages. In this scenario, the sending entity and the
receiving entity share three things: a webpage, sender’s (web

Methodology and Experiments

The methodology section details how the encoding and
decoding operations are performed by the sender and the
receiver respectively. In order to present the feasibility and
practicality of our webpage source based covert channel, a
proof of concept was developed in python. The
implementation includes two scripts wherein one of the scripts
is used to carry out encoding on the web client while the other
is responsible for decoding the message at the web server.
1) Sender Side: The sender side implementation of this covert
channel can be described as the following phases.
Phase 1: URL Dictionary: The first task is to obtain and read
and parse the webpage source. We build the URL dictionary,
as illustrated in Fig. 1, by assigning numbers (termed as URL
numbers) to a uniquely sorted list of URLs identified from the
webpage source. The URL numbers act as keys and the URLs
represent their values. If there are n URLs retrieved from the
webpage, every URL is mapped to a number starting from 0 to
n-1. We reserve the first three URLs, termed as Control URLs,
to define activities such as indication of start or end of a
covert message transfer. The purpose of each Control URL is
presented in Table 1.
TABLE I
CONTROL URLS
URL Number Indication
0

Start of communication

1

Wait for next URL

2

End of communication

3 to N-1

A word or a shift

URL Number : URL
3 : http://www.rit.edu/alumni.html
4 : http://www.rit.edu/alumni_photos.html
5 : http://www.rit.edu/campuslife.html

followed by the URL {1} indicates that it is a multiple URL or
sequence and that the next URL indicates the specific word
The Wait URL allows this scheme to represent (n-3) single
URL encodings and (n-3)*(n-3) multiple URL encoded words.
Therefore if we have n URLs in the webpage we can encode a
maximum number of words of

6 : http://www.rit.edu/centers.html
7 : http://www.rit.edu/co-op.html
8 : http://www.rit.edu/colleges.html

Figure 1. A sample from URL Dictionary built using RIT’s
homepage

.{max words} = (n-3) + (n-3)2
Phase 3: User Input: The final phase at the sender’s side
would include accepting URL numbers (mapped to words)
from the sender in order to invoke respective URL requests.
Word : URL Number

Phase 2: Word List & Mapping: In addition to the retrieval of
URLs, we also retrieve words from the webpage source and
uniquely sort the list of words in alphabetical order. The word
dictionary is obtained by mapping words from this word list to
the URL number(s) as demonstrated in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3.

about : (3)

It is likely that in a webpage, the number of URLs would be
less than the number of words in most cases, so we use the
following approach to map the words and URLs. The purpose
of linking URLs to words is to send or receive a word of the
message based on the URL requests. Tthe URL numbers {0},
{1} and {2} are reserved for representing control URLs so we
begin mapping the words from URL number {3}.. We make
use of Single URL mapping and Multiple URL mapping
techniques to link URLs and words. In the Single URL
mapping technique, a word is linked directly to only one URL
while in the Multiple URL Mapping technique a word is
linked to a sequence of URLs. Starting alphabetically, the
words are assigned single URLs from {3} through {n-1} to
indicate the word desired. Then we utilize the URLs {3}
through {n-1} again as shift indicators followed by the URL
{1} to indicate the the preceding URL was a shift and not a
word. This sequence is then followed by another URLfrom
{3} to {n-1}to indicate the word desired. So, some words in
the word dictionary (like “about” shown in Fig. 2) are mapped
to a single URL and hence it takes only one URL request to
convey such words. Other words of the word dictionary are
mapped to multiple URLs (like “research in Fig.3). These
words are conveyed by requesting the shift URL and a Wait
URL followed by the word URL. The wait URL is used to
indicate that for this particular word there exists multiple
URLs mapped to it. Hence the receiver program must examine
the URL following each initial URL to determine if it is a
single or sequence of URLs.
If a URL is followed
immediately by a Wait URL then it is a mutliple URL or
sequence.. In the example presented, “about” takes only one
URL request which is URL number {3} while “research”
requires three URL requests which are URL number {12}
followed by the URL number {1}, which is the Wait URL (to
indicate there is more than one URL mapped to the word
research), and URL number {48}. The URL {12} being

academicaffairs : (6)

abroad : (4)
academic : (5)

Figure 2. Single URL Mapping Sample
Word : URL Numbers
requirements : (12, 1, 47)
research : (12, 1, 48)
researcher : (12, 1, 49)
reserved : (12, 1, 50)
Figure 3. Multiple URL Mapping Sample
This way for every word of the covert message, mapped
URL(s) are accessed. With reference to Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, for
sending the covert message “about research”, we must input
the URLs {3} for about and {12, 48} for research. The same
is illustrated in Fig. 4.
Words Available: 715
Total Available URLs: 51
Please enter the number of words you want to send: 2
Do you want to send a covert message now: [yes/no]? Yes
Start URL Sent
Instructions:
1.enter the URL numbers mapped to the WORDS
2.use space if multiple URL numbers are mapped to a WORD
word 1 – URL Number(s): 3
word 2 – URL Number(s): 12 48
END URL Sent
Covert message sent!!!
Figure 4. Send Covert Message

2) Receiver Side: The implementation on the receiver side is
identical to the server side implementation except that the keyvalue pairs built for the dictionaries are reversed to facilitate
decoding of covert message.
Phase 1: URL Dictionary: The first phase for both the sender
and receiver are the same as it involves building a dictionary
of URLs from the webpage that was decided prior to the
communication. However, structurally the key, value pair of
dictionary is reversed. In this implementation, the URL acts as
the key while the numbers act as their corresponding values.
Phase 2: Word List & Mapping: After building the URL
dictionary as mentioned above, the receiver builds a word list
and then performs word-URL number mapping but in this case
the URL number acts as key and its corresponding values are
the words parsed from the webpage source.

5.2

It is very difficult for a regular observer or a capable
administrator to detect the proposed covert channel as existing
content of the webpage source and legitimate URL requests
are utilized for its implementation and no alterations are made
to the source code.

5.3

TABLE II
SOME WORD-URLSTATISTICS
Words
URLs
Webpage
Available
Available

Enter your web page: http://www.rit.edu
Enter PCAP path: c:\captures\ritcovert.pcap
Enter Sender’s IP: 192.168.0.6

www.rit.edu

730

51

Covert Message: about research

www.cnn.com

1753

119

www.premierleague.com

931

174

Figure 5. Receive Covert Message

5.1

Throughput

With reference to the word-URL mapping example
described in the previous section, sending each word of the
message takes either one or three URL requests. Every word
either takes one or three URL requests as some words are
mapped to a single URL and would hence require only one
URL request while other words mapped to two URLs are
implemented by requesting first URL followed by Wait URL
and then the second URL. Considering this, a message having
10 words would take 10-30 URL requests excluding the Start
URL and the End URL. This clearly indicates that the
proposed covert channel demonstrates much higher bandwidth
unlike the existing HTML based covert channels. Table II
presents the number of URLs and words parsed from some
pages at the time of writing this paper.

H:\>python read.py
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Robustness

The robustness of this channel is high considering the
channel’s ability of being persistent in the presence of
firewalls, proxy servers, routers, etc. The message transfer is
carried out by accessing URLs which are basically mapped to
words using the encoding scheme. Since these URLs are
legitimate HTTP requests they are not deterred by devices
mentioned above.

5.4
Phase 3: Retrieval (PCAP/Apache Log): The final phase of the
program on the receiver side is responsible for retrieving the
message and displaying it to the receiver. This phase requires
an additional input which is the packet capture file (.pcap) in
our case. An apache access.log file is an alternative option.
The reason for implementing using a packet capture is to
imply that such a mechanism can be incorporated for other
scenarios where a man-in-the-middle receiver, which is a
system between the web client and web server, is the covert
message receiver and captures the HTTP requests to decode
the covert message. On receiving the packet capture file and
sending entity’s IP address as input, the receiver program
retrieves the URLs requested by the sender from the packet
capture and utilizes these URLs to decode the message sent as
shown in Fig. 5.

Imperceptibility

Covert Channel Characteristics
Type

The proposed covert channel falls under the category of
covert storage channel. This is because the sender’s URL
requests are captured in pcap (packet capture) file or the web
server log and the receiver reads the packet capture or web
server log to decode the message obtained.

5.5

Prevention

The imperceptibility factor plays a very crucial role in
this covert channel. Though it is quite difficult to detect this
covert channel, on identifying the existence of this covert
channel, the channel can be disrupted by injecting HTTP
requests for URLs existing in the URL dictionary with source
IP address spoofed to that of the covert message sender.
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Future Work

Though the proposed covert channel fares high on various
characteristics, certain modifications and implementations can
further improve the effectiveness of this channel. The message
(word) dictionary part of the encoding/decoding mechanism
can be improved by implementing an algorithm that would
build the message dictionary from the webpage source on the
basis of word occurrence frequency in the English language.
This approach will help in ignoring words that are less likely
to be used. Also, the implementation must be improved to
ignore redirection of a URL to another URL that already exists
in the URL dictionary as it might result in the transfer of
incorrect messages. The widely varying sequence of URL
requests would not be suspicious as it might look like a user
browsing through different pages of a website however it
might result in suspicion when these widely varying sequence
of URL requests are made in a very short span of time by the
same user. To prevent any suspicion or identification of the
existence of this channel as a result of multiple URL requests
from the same source in a short duration of time, the code can
be modified to implement random wait times between multiple
URL requests.

7

Conclusion

A communication channel, used to transfer secret message
within the same system or across a network, where there is
seemingly no communication taking place can be termed as
covert channels. A new covert channel based on webpage
source was exhibited in this paper. The covert channel
presented, used words and URLs available in a webpage
source to enable unidirectional covert communication from a
web client to a web server. This covert channel does not
modify the webpage source while demonstrating high
imperceptibility and channel capacity.
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